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BOOK REVIEWS 
Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics by Christopher J. Eberle. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. x, 405. $75 (hardcover), $28 (paper-
back); Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship by Paul J. Weithman. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xi, 227. $55 (hardcover). 
EDWARD LANGERAK, St. Olaf College 
The sheer amount of literature on the "religion in the public square" de-
bate has become overwhelming, but these two cutting-edge books are 
welcome additions indeed, since they perceptively analyze the most im-
portant previous contributions and also make genuine advances in the 
discussion. It is appropriate to review them together; they share a deep 
appreciation for some of the main moral aims of political liberalism, as 
well as sharp but measured dissent from it. Also, they can be put into dia-
logue with each other, and not just because the authors thank each other 
in their acknowledgements. 
I begin with Paul Weithman's book, which is less encompassing and 
briefer, though refreshingly distinctive in its significant use of empiri-
cal evidence for its criticism of the "liberal restraint principle," or what 
Weithman calls lithe standard view," what Christopher Eberle calls "justi-
ficatory liberalism," and what the late John Rawls made a defining char-
acteristic of "political liberalism." A generic version of the restraint prin-
ciple is that conscientious citizens ought to restrain themselves from using 
non-public reasons to advocate coercive legislation unless they also are 
willing and able to provide public reasons for it. Rawls has been the main 
instigator and target in this debate, and in his last published discussion 
of public reason, he credits Weithman for increasing his sensitivity to the 
role of religion as an important contributor to democracy.! One wishes 
Rawls could have read this book, because Weithman marshals an impres-
sive array of empirical research (chapter two) to show just how important 
religious convictions and institutions have been in enabling people-es-
pecially minority and low income people-to achieve what he calls "re-
alized citizenship" and "full participation" (carefully defined in chapter 
one) in their society. Since Rawls would agree that the latter is a great 
good for a democracy, and since it comes as a package with the tendency 
to use religious arguments in the public square, Rawls would have had 
a better appreciation of the tradeoffs for the health of democracy that his 
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restraint principle would impose. Whether the restraint principle would 
undermine the healthy roles of religious institutions and convictions in 
nurturing good citizenship, or whether it at least would cost significant 
frustration and alienation (given the religious source of much good citi-
zenship) is, to a large extent, an empirical issue, and anyone who enters 
this debate should read Weithman's book. 
Of course, there is also the normative side of the issue; even if political 
liberals agreed that there are significant social and political costs to the re-
straint principle, they may claim that the duty of civic respect requires that 
we pay it. So in the rest of his book, Weithman directly takes on the rel-
evant normative issues. First, some conceptual ground clearing. Chapter 
five rebuts two concepts of what "votes" are and advocates a third: they 
are neither simply expressions of preferences (they are counted and de-
termine political outcomes) nor exercises of power (when is the last time 
your vote was decisive?). Rather, a voter is "voluntarily doing his part in 
a role-specific collective undertaking: citizens' collective undertaking of 
determining political outcomes" (103). And that is why it must be done re-
sponsibly; to vote irresponsibly is to "fail the universalizability test" since 
"I would want to know that my interests have been properly taken into 
account" by other voters (104). With the other concepts of voting, 1 may 
want to know only that my vote counted equally, but in a collective under-
taking, especially one in which the government is seen as our agent (114), I 
have not only "liberty interests" at stake, but also "reputational interests" 
(116). Weithman concludes that responsible voting and advocacy requires 
citizens having "what they reasonably take to be adequate reasons for im-
pinging on" (109) others'interests. 
And what are these adequate reasons? What sort of restraints, if any, 
should responsible citizens impose on themselves? Here Weithman pro-
poses what might be seen as a middle ground between the liberal restraint 
principle, on the one hand, and a radically inclusive, "anything (legal) 
goes" view (sometimes called "agonistic," from Greek for "contest"), on 
the other. Here are his two central principles: 
(5.1) Citizens of a liberal democracy may base their votes on reasons 
drawn from their comprehensive moral views, including their reli-
gious views, without having other reasons that are sufficient for their 
vote-provided they sincerely believe that their government would 
be justified in adopting the measures they vote for. (5.2) Citizens of 
a liberal democracy may offer arguments in public political debate 
which depend upon reasons drawn from their comprehensive moral 
views, including their religious views, without making them good 
by appeal to other arguments-provided they believe that their gov-
ernment would be justified in adopting the measures they favor and 
are prepared to indicate what they think would justify the adoption 
of the measures. 
Notice first that the bar is lower for voting than for advocacy-voters 
need not be prepared to say what they think justifies the measure. For 
one thing, when 1 am voting in private 1 may reliably remember that 1 
was once convinced by an excellent argument that I should vote a certain 
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way, but I have now forgotten the argument itself (127). So I know I have a 
good reason, but cannot (not just will not) say what it is. On the other hand, 
when I am publicly advocating for a particular vote, I need to have the 
details of the argument; I cannot expect other citizens to trust my memory 
that I had a good one while I admit that I forgot what it was. As one who 
has reached the point of knowing that I hid my own Easter eggs without 
knowing where, I am charmed by Weithman's position here. But Eberle, 
who is younger, will have none of it: "A citizen's obligation to respect his 
compatriots imposes on him an obligation to do his best to address [them] 
... to inform them about his reasons for coercing them" (95). Weithman 
says that the sort of sentiment that Eberle articulates is an excellence of 
citizenship, but insists it is not a duty (129). 
Notice second that Weithman's proviso differs from the liberal restraint 
principle in insisting only that advocates be prepared to indicate what they 
think justifies the measure; they need not be prepared to appeal to consid-
erations they reasonably think others could reasonably accept as justifying 
the measure. His examples include Jerry, who votes for legislation and 
candidates just because they agree with his religious doctrine of natural 
law (and thereby, he sincerely believes, promote the common good), and 
Sarah, who justifies voting for particular candidates just because they are 
endorsed by her pastor and she sincerely believes her pastor is an author-
ity on the relevant issues. The liberal restraint principle would ask them 
to be prepared either to give some additional-public-reasons for the 
decision, or at least to give some public reasons for accepting natural law 
or the pastor's credentials as a political authority. Weithman insists that 
even if it would be ideal to give public reasons, it is not an obligation. He 
thinks political liberals mistakenly "begin by trying to determine what 
justifications or reasons citizens are obliged to offer one another" or "be-
gin with intuitions about civility" and then let these considerations set 
the benchmark for political civility (135). But his "collective undertaking" 
analysis of voting and advocacy implies that the political liberal puts the 
cart before the horse: citizens "cannot determine ... [what is responsible 
citizenship] ... without knowing what arguments they can reasonably 
expect others to offer them" (135). This "reasonably expect" (applied not 
just to arguments from others, but also to expectations of how they vote 
and how they treat others) can be interpreted either as "what a reasonable 
person can expect," which is largely an empirical issue, or as "expecta-
tions regarding reasonable arguments and conduct," which is largely a 
normative one. The empirical interpretation clearly distinguishes itself 
from the normative approach of the political liberal. But, given the qual-
ity and types of arguments (and voting habits and ways of treating the 
opposition) actually used in American politics, it seems an unpromising 
route to political wisdom. So I think Weithman takes the normative route: 
"What expectations are reasonable depends, in turn, on how it is reason-
able for citizens to think of their role and on what citizens can reason-
ably expect others to believe about the reasons they owe each other" (135). 
Now, using a normative filter for what is reasonable seems similar in spirit 
to the above rejected strategy of political liberals. So probably Weithman is 
simply pleading for a wider sense of "reasonable": "If there are reasonable 
disagreements about what kinds of reasons are accessible ... then it would 
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be unreasonable for some citizens to expect others to offer them reasons 
they [the hearers, presumably] regard as accessible" (135). Here Weithman 
may be underscoring a possible circularity in political liberalism when 
it distinguishes "reasonable" from "rational" and perhaps conceptually 
builds right into the former the restraint principle itself: "Reasonable per-
sons ... desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and 
equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept."2 Depending on 
what is meant by "terms all can accept," one probably needs some more 
premises to get to the restraint principle, but such premises are sometimes 
treated as explications of "free and equal" or as obviously embedded in 
"fair" or "civility." At any rate, it would seem to beg the question for the 
political liberal to have a notion of reasonable that is so morally loaded 
that it entails the restraint principle. 
Weithman's final two chapters consist of criticism of Robert Audi's3 and 
Rawls's versions of political liberalism. Both Weithman and Eberle present 
data and considerations aimed at showing that Audi's worries about reli-
gious fanaticism are overblown. Moreover some of the very "totalizing" 
features of religious commitments that Audi underscores are a recipe for 
resentment and alienation in those believers who are asked to refrain from 
integrating their non-public doctrines into their political arguments while 
seeing controversial secular doctrines carry the debate (Eberle, 183). 
Weithman's final chapter concludes that Rawls's restraint principle "is 
an attractive liberal democratic ideal" (211), but he insists throughout that 
"it is not immediately clear how moral ideals can impose moral require-
ments" (186). This brings us to Eberle who, I think, disagrees on both 
counts, but does so because of a "pursuit principle" that is consistent with 
the spirit of Weithman's book. Eberle gives clear-headed and fair-minded 
summaries of most of the major writings in this area over the past few 
decades, and he integrates them into his own perceptive critique of the 
main views and his original contribution to the debate. The latter includes 
notably his distinction between the principle of pursuit- his proposal that 
citizens should respect each other by pursuing the ideal of conscientious 
engagement-and the doctrine of restraint, which he rejects. 
Eberle introduces his distinction in Part Two, after discussing in Part 
One some of the important empirical research about religion, citizenship, 
and pluralism and also introducing what he calls "justificatory liberalism" 
and its restraint principle. With his distinction, Eberle addresses two very 
different audiences. First, he "has no interest in providing aid and comfort 
for a mindless or intransigent sectarianism" (187), so he tries to persuade 
the "anything goes" crowd that they are morally obliged "to exit their pa-
rochial world views, to do what is within their power to inhabit the respec-
tive points of view of their compatriots, and to attempt to articulate rea-
sons ... that are convincing to their compatriots" (82). Second, he wants to 
persuade the political liberal that, if citizens have sincerely pursued public 
justification but have failed to find public reasons, then they are not mor-
ally bound by the restraint principle, and they may in good conscience 
vote and advocate for coercive legislation based only on their distinctive 
religious beliefs. 
The six constraints for the pursuit principle add up to an "ideal of con-
scientious engagement" (104) that is rigorous indeed: 1. Pursue a high 
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degree of rational and moral justification for the favored coercive policy. 
2. Withhold support from a policy for which one does not find a suffi-
ciently high degree of rational justification (which by itself seems to imply 
Weithman's 5.1 and 5.2 principles cited above). 3. Attempt to communicate 
to compatriots the reason for the coercive policy. 4. Pursue public justi-
fications for it. 5. Listen to and try to learn from compatriots' critiques.4 
6. Avoid any rationale that denies the equal dignity of compatriots. Eb-
erle justifies this list not so much as an indirect moral duty based on the 
pragmatic considerations that it will help achieve one's morally important 
cause (though it will) or that it will enhance civil peace (though it will) 
but mainly as a matter of "recognition respect" toward persons, which he 
patiently and at great length unpacks as implying a prima facie obligation 
to refrain from coercion and hence an obligation to justify it when it is 
necessary (85-104). 
With what Eberle calls "the argument from Bosnia," some liberals call 
for privatizing religion in order to avoid war and conflict. Eberle argues 
that this consideration is not relevant to the United States today. He agrees 
that there are regions today where the argument is (and times in history 
when it would be) "compelling" and "privatization is essential" (158). 
Since the most volatile areas, such as Bosnia and Palestine, are ones that 
include believers with the" overriding and totalizing obligation to obey 
God" (149) that Eberle uses to reject the inclusive restraint principle in the 
United States, it is worth noting that in other circumstances he sees this 
commitment as compatible with a privatization that is even more restrict-
ing than the restraint principle. So the overriding and totalizing duty to 
God yields only a prima facie duty to integrate one's religion with one's 
political advocacy. 
Liberals also use what Eberle calls the" argument from divisiveness," 
which he rebuts by claiming that any divisiveness caused by using distinc-
tive religious arguments seems outweighed by the divisiveness caused by 
trying to privatize them. He cites some significant costs of privatizing; for 
example, where would we be without the abolitionists, and would it not 
be better to have people be open - and criticizable - about their religious 
politics instead of secretive? 
Eberle makes a very important and, I believe, astute observation in 
claiming that too often people collapse the pursuit ideal into the restraint 
principle, thinking too hastily that any obligation to pursue public reasons 
implies the obligation of restraint if one cannot find them. I think he is 
also right in thinking that if integrated religious believers, who feel deeply 
obliged to inform their politics with their religious identity, were disposed 
to satisfy the pursuit ideal, resentment toward religiously-based coercion 
would be reduced, acquiescence toward it would be more palatable, and 
many political liberals should and would be more sympathetic to the 
overriding of the restraint principle when public reasons for coercive leg-
islation cannot be found. I think he is perceptive in surmising that much 
of the offense that political liberals feel comes when fundamentalists reject 
both the pursuit ideal and the restraint principle, especially on hot-button 
issues like homosexuality (111). 
One argument I worry about involves Eberle's claim that "a citizen who 
respects his compatriots is forbidden to treat them as a means only, but he 
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isn't forbidden from treating them as a means at all" (125). Eberle sees this 
as implying that if citizens trying to coerce me engage the pursuit ideal, 
they are treatin.g me as an end, and when they reject the restraint prin-
ciple, coercing me without providing arguments they reasonably think I 
reasonably could accept, they are simultaneously treating me as both an 
end and a means. Let's say I try to persuade you with public arguments 
that you should give me the money in your billfold (you are rich and I am 
poor; I need the money to help my children; you are intending to spend 
it on golf; etc.) but I cannot find any that I can reasonably expect you can 
reasonably accept (you have a thing about property rights; you already 
tithe; golf is central to the meaning of your life; etc.). So, while continuing 
my efforts to persuade you, I also pull my concealed gun, perhaps say-
ing with sadness and pity for you that God tells me to help my children. 
Imagine my trying to convince Immanuel Kant that I am not treating you 
as a mere means. He would point out that what's relevant to that issue 
is not just what I do but what I do not do to have my way with you. In 
particular, I do not coerce you without your explicit or implicit informed 
consent, as when students use teachers, and vice versa. And the details of 
what democratic compatriots do or should consent to by way of political 
decision-making are exactly what this debate is all about. 
Even if Eberle dropped the above argument, he could still maintain that 
those who fulfilled the pursuit principle are sometimes justified in going 
against the restraint principle. How often this would happen depends on 
the availability of public reasons, which Eberle addresses in the third and 
final part of his book. Eberle claims that "public reason(s)" suggests a set 
of considerations that would appeal to all reasonable audiences, and he 
quickly locates trouble for the populist understanding of public justifica-
tion (204--05). By relying on what people actually accept, it does respect 
people as they actually are, but it needs qualification, since there are likely 
(almost) no beliefs that every person in the country accepts. At a mini-
mum, political liberals will have to rule out young children and the men-
tally incompetent. And any stronger qualifications get dicey. The most 
influential view has been that of Rawls: public reasons are those that rea-
sonable citizens can reasonably believe the other citizens can reasonably 
accept. Note that others need not actually accept them, since they may be 
making a mistake in logic or failing to recognize some part of the public 
culture that they could recognize. Of course, "could" cannot be interpreted 
as "logically possible" or even "causally possible," since my accepting the 
thickest and most distinctive parts of my comprehensive doctrine implies 
that others theoretically could as well. So the scope of public reason must 
include what reasonable people could assent to within their distinctive 
comprehensive doctrines. As Rawls lately put it, we should be able to 
think inside another's moral identity enough to be able, in a sincere and 
non-manipulative way, to "conjecture ... [from] other people's basic doc-
trines, religious or secular, and try to show them that, despite what they 
might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception that 
can provide a basis for public reasons" (Law of Peoples, 156). Eberle thinks 
that, since reasonable persons accept Rawls's burdens of judgement, (in-
cluding the recognition that reasonable people will weigh different types 
of values differently, having lived different kinds of lives), this route leads 
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to agreement on little but "the most platitudinous claims" (215). In fact, 
says Eberle, given that John Calvin reasonably believed that agreements 
on fundamentals is essential to social order, he reasonably rejected reli-
gious freedom and reasonably burned Servetus at the stake. Eberle thinks 
that the alternative to his analysis here is that Rawls builds a commitment 
to religious freedom right into his conception of "reasonable," in which 
case the latter "would be utterly without interest" (383, n.48). But recall 
that in his evaluation of the argument from Bosnia, Eberle discounted 
worries about religious freedom in the United States today, partly because 
(as he had argued earlier) even fundamentalists, to say nothing of Calvin-
ists and evangelicals, see that they have a vested interest in it, since con-
flict fosters group cohesion (43). Rawls would add that it has become part 
of our "public culture." "We collect such settled convictions as the belief 
in religious toleration and the rejection of slavery and try to organize the 
basic ideas and principles implicit in these convictions" (Political Liberal-
ism, 8) into what he lately agrees is "a family of political conceptions of 
justice, and not just one," that will yield "many forms of public reason 
... [including] Catholic views of the common good and solidarity when 
they are expressed in terms of political values" (Law of Peoples, 140-42). So 
into "reasonable" Rawls builds the willingness to appeal to one among 
several versions of public reason that are a plausible interpretation of the 
public culture. This latitude allows a fair amount of flexibility, but surely 
it requires in a nontrivial way that any reasonable United States citizen 
have a version of public reason that includes lip service to religious free-
dom. In fact, one wonders how even Christian Reconstructionists today 
can have Calvin's "stability belief" in their "evidential set" of beliefs that 
meet minimal standards of rationality. So I do not think Eberle's appeal 
to the burdens of judgement shows that there are only a few Rawlsian 
public reasons. Indeed, Rawls's above ecumenical talk of many forms of 
public reason could invite an inordinately wide reflective equilibrium in 
interpreting "public culture," yielding a rather bloated but debatable set 
of public reasons. However we are talking about civic virtue here, a moral 
internal restraint rather than a legally precise external constraint, and I see 
no reason why political liberals cannot appeal to the sort of sincerity and 
discernment that is a necessary part of any appeal to virtues and ideals. 
The alternate to Rawlsian looseness is to make the category of public 
reasons more precise by building an epistemological filter into the rea-
soner ("adequately informed" or "fully rational") or the reason ("publicly 
accessible, or intelligible, or replicable, or confirmable," etc.). In chapter 
eight, Eberle's obvious enjoyment of and skill at analytic philosophizing 
shows that all of the usual suspects by way of epistemological restrictions 
either throw out the public wheat or else let in the private chaff. Using 
William Alston's highly regarded work in religious epistemology, he ar-
gues that mystical perception (or Christian Mystical Practice-CMP) satis-
fies most of the plausible normative filters, and the ones that it has trouble 
with are ones that also trip up the moral beliefs necessary to political lib-
eralism. Did you know that "I perceived God telling me to do it" is in the 
same public intelligibility boat with "I perceived my mother telling me to 
do it"? Before you roll your eyes, read his argument (252-54). Justificatory 
liberals who shun the looseness of the above Rawlsian approach will, no 
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doubt, do some nit-picking on some of Eberle's arguments, but I think this 
chapter should be required homework for them. 
Eberle concludes with a critique of the theistic argument for the re-
straint principle, given by Audi and Robert Perry, among others. They 
argue that since an all-good and all-powerful God would see to it that 
normal people know their moral obligations, at least the basic ones that 
should be encoded into law, theists should be suspicious of any religious 
demands for coercive legislation that cannot be backed by public reasons. 
As Eberle points out, this assumes a lot of optimism about how people use 
their God-given reason, and even theists who reject the doctrine of total 
depravity can argue that, given human nature and what we know about 
how our cognitive faculties can fail and be abused, sometimes believers 
may and even must trust religious convictions that contradict worldly 
wisdom. His example is legalizing heterosexual monogamy; other exam-
ples could be legislation against divorce or the pre-1965 legal prohibition 
of contraceptives. If these examples are problematic, that just underscores 
his realism when he concedes that "many of the policies citizens support 
solely on the basis of religious grounds will be misguided, foolhardy, or 
muddleheaded" (333). But that is the price of democracy. Interestingly, 
Audi's case for what he calls "Theo-ethical Equilibrium" is, I think, quite 
compatible with much of what Eberle says. Audi says that the pursuit 
of equilibrium is a prima facie obligation of civic virtue, and that when 
a conflict occurs, we should rethink both our religious and our secular 
convictions, and then decide which ones, if any, to adjust (Audi, 136-37). 
Given Eberle's pursuit principle, there is common ground here: failure to 
find public reasons should stimulate some (re)searching of one's political 
and moral beliefs as well as one's Biblical exegeses and even hermeneutics. 
There are texts such as Exodus 31:14-15 that demand death for anyone 
working on the Sabbath, but most contemporary Christians who integrate 
their politics and religion have found ways of interpreting these texts 
without advocating blue laws (much less the death penalty for violating 
them), and it would be no sign of religious laxity if they raised the same 
sort of considerations about texts regarding homosexuality. 
This point raises the larger question of just how far apart Eberle and 
Weithman are from political liberals such as Audi. The latter concedes that 
integrated believers have a moral (to say nothing of legal) right to vote and 
advocate solely on religious grounds, and that what the restraint principle 
proposes is an ideal that yields only a prima facie obligation, the consci-
entious overriding of which is excusable (Audi, 95, 114,203). Meanwhile, 
Weithman agrees time and again that political liberalism proposes an ap-
propriate ideal or excellence of citizenship (129, lSI, 211) but at the same 
time raises the important question of how one moves from ideals to obli-
gations, since "there are times when it is permissible to behave irresponsi-
bly even if it is not good or ideal to do so" (100). Even Audi's "merely pri-
ma facie" (161) responsibilities need moral justification as obligations (163), 
Weithman points out. Eberle does not debate the issue; he just goes ahead 
and makes the move: the "ideal of conscientious engagement" consists of 
"constraints ... that each citizen ought to obey" (84) because, "as Robert 
Audi has helpfully argued in this context, a citizen who doesn't violate 
anyone's moral rights might nevertheless be morally criticizable" (105) for 
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disobeying an ideal that they are "morally obliged to obey" (188). Eberle 
explicitly recognizes that Audi's restraint principle is a prima facie one 
(56), and he ecumenically makes his proposed right for religious citizens 
to go against it a prima facie one: even though they have the moral (and, 
of course, legal) right to reject the restraint principle, they "ought to be 
extremely reluctant to impose coercive laws on their compatriots" (188). 
Well, a reader can be excused for wondering if what we have here 
is mainly a difference in emphasis. I suspect that if Audi, Eberle, and 
Weithman (and the spirit of Rawls) could discuss a suitably nuanced ap-
proach to levels of moral responsibility, they might find some convergence 
in the debate over debates in the public square. 
NOTES 
1. "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," in John Rawls, The Law of Peo-
ples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 154. 
2. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993),50. 
3. Audi's view is summed up in Religious Commitment and Secular Reasoll 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Reviewed in this journal by 
Francis Beckwith, January 2002 (19/1). 
4. Because one can be a fallibilist about one's politics without being a falli-
bilist about one's deepest religious commitments (l03-there must be a "not" 
missing in the fourth line from the bottom). 
Democracy and Tradition, by Jeffrey Stout. Princeton University Press, 2004. 
Pp. xvi + 348. $35.00 (cloth). 
PAUL WEITHMAN, University of Notre Dame 
Pessimists about democracy worry that contemporary democracies can-
not foster the qualities their citizens must have if these societies are to 
remain democratic.! This is a worry most commonly voiced by American 
neo-conservatives. It is very different from two charges leveled at democ-
racy by other thinkers who are also sometimes called "conservative" but 
whom Jeffrey Stout more aptly labels "neo-traditionalists": the charge that 
democracies are not societies in which the good life can be led, and the 
stronger charge that the social forces at work in democracies make their 
citizens bad people.2 
In this highly intelligent and challenging book, Stout directs a force-
ful combination of arguments against neo-traditionalist criticisms of 
democracy. The concluding pages of the book suggest that Stout thinks 
those arguments also provide him the material he needs to address the 
neo-conservative worry (307-08; see also 12). Democracy and Tradition is 
therefore not only an intelligent and challenging book, but a very ambi-
tious one as well. It is a book in which Stout tries to layout grounds for 
the hope he places in democracy, and to hold those grounds against the 
doubts and objections of a wide range of thinkers. Indeed, showing that 
hope in democracy is-to paraphrase Kant's remarks about reasonable 
